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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                                   
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Roberto Santos-Estrella pleaded guilty to being an alien who unlawfully reentered
the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).  He was
sentenced to forty-one months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
release.  This appeal does not challenge his conviction.  Rather, Santos-Estrella contends,
for the first time, that the District Court erred in calculating his offense level under United
States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) by applying the 16 level
enhancement for prior “drug trafficking” offenses.  Application of this enhancement,
according to Santos-Estrella, was precluded under the formal categorical approach
embraced in United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), because the New York statute
under which he had been previously convicted required proof of possession only.  Santos-
Estrella also asserts that the District Court erred in refusing to depart downward because
it believed it lacked the authority to do so.  Relying on Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct.
2531 (2004), Santos-Estrella argues that the District Court’s findings at sentencing
violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
On March 9, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in United
3States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), holding that the federal sentencing guidelines
were not mandatory, but advisory only.  Id. at 757.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision, this Court requested that the parties address Booker’s applicability.  Although
Santos-Estrella asserted that Booker applied, he maintained that the sentencing issues he
raised should be resolved.  
Thereafter, in United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc), this
Court explained that in direct appeals of sentences imposed before Booker, where the
District Court erroneously treated the Guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory and
where  we are unable to “ascertain whether the District Court would have imposed a
greater or lesser sentence under an advisory framework,” prejudice in a plain error
analysis “can be presumed.”  Id. at 164-65.  We declared that a “[f]ailure to remand for
resentencing . . . could adversely affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. 
Accordingly, defendants sentenced under the previously mandatory regime whose
sentences are being challenged on direct appeal may be able to demonstrate plain error
and prejudice.”  Id. at 165.  Thus, we concluded that in such cases a remand for
resentencing is warranted so the District Court may consider the appropriate sentence in
the first instance.  Id. at 166.
In light of our holding in Davis, we asked counsel for Santos-Estrella during oral
argument whether, if we remanded for resentencing under Booker, we were required to
reach the issues he raised on appeal.  We also noted that Santos-Estrella had not raised his
4challenge to the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) when he
was before the District Court and that there existed the possibility that the District Court
might agree with his position on remand.  Counsel conceded that our consideration of the
appropriateness of this sentencing enhancement was not “a strict necessity.”  We agree. 
Consistent with Davis, 407 F.3d at 166, we conclude that the sentencing issues raised by
Santos-Estrella, including the applicability of both the enhancement in §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and Taylor’s categorical approach, are best determined by the District
Court in the first instance.  For that reason, we will affirm Santos-Estrella’s conviction,
vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker.  
